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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
ABOUT OFFICER IMMUNITY
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
If there is a single foundational assumption in conventional thinking
about official immunity doctrines, it is that “[t]he resolution of immunity
questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any
available alternative.”1 On the one hand, it is thought, it would be costly
and unfair to hold officials liable out of their own pockets whenever they
make erroneous constitutional judgments. 2 On the other hand, to deny
redress to victims of constitutional violations is not only unfair to them, 3
but also diminishes the significance of constitutional rights more broadly by
undermining incentives for officials to stay within constitutional bounds.4
My first goal in this Essay will be to refute the assumption that official
immunity doctrine necessarily requires a balance of evils. Although it is
undoubtedly true (indeed, almost tautologically so) that official immunity
reduces the value of rights, analysis goes wrong at the outset if it assumes
that the substantive content of constitutional guarantees and the availability
of causes of action to enforce them are fixed, and only then asks whether
official immunity should exist as a regrettably necessary expedient. As
Professor John Jeffries has observed, official immunity is not a variable
among constants but, instead, is one potential variable among others.5
* Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Dan Meltzer
and Peter Schuck for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Alexander
Dryer, Mark Savignac, and Previn Warren for outstanding research assistance. In case my
views might have been influenced in any way, I should disclose that, during the period in
which I wrote this Article, I was representing a plaintiff in a constitutional tort action who
was seeking to overcome an official immunity defense.
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982); see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies
and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (characterizing the law of remedies as “a
jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost between declaring a right and implementing a
remedy”).
2. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806, 813–14; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239–40
(1974); cf. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 98–99 (1983).
3. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
4. See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity
Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 630–31; Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional
Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997, 1019 (1990)
(criticizing the argument that victims should not be compensated for all foreseeable damages
caused by unconstitutional conduct).
5. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87, 99–100 (1999).
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According to him, in the absence of official immunity doctrines, courts
might prove more hesitant to expand the scope of constitutional rights.6
Although Jeffries seems indubitably right about this point, the insight that
official immunity is a variable among variables has further-reaching
implications than even he has recognized. In the absence of official
immunity, even some currently well-established constitutional rights and
authorizations to sue to enforce them would likely shrink, and sometimes
appropriately so. 7
This reflection both leads to and helps corroborate a broader insight
about the relationship among constitutional rights, causes of action to
enforce such rights, justiciability doctrines, official immunity, and various
rules of pleading and proof that I call the doctrinal Equilibration Thesis.8
According to the Equilibration Thesis, substantive rights, causes of action
to enforce rights, rules of pleading and proof, and immunity doctrines all
are flexible and potentially adjustable components of a package of rights
and enforcement mechanisms that should be viewed, and assessed for
desirability, as a whole. 9 If the Equilibration Thesis is correct, it falsifies
the assumption that official immunity is at best a distasteful necessity.
Instead, the Equilibration Thesis casts official immunity as a potential
mechanism for achieving the best overall bundle of rights and
correspondingly calibrated remedies within our constitutional system.
Viewing immunity doctrine as a potential variable among variables
frames a question that should occupy the forefront of debates about official
immunity: what are the distinctive features of official immunity that might
make it well or poorly adapted—in comparison with other potentially
adjustable variables—for achieving an optimal bundle of rights and
surrounding jurisdictional and related doctrines? My second goal in this
Essay is to make progress toward answering this question. In comparison
with adjustments of rights and many causes of action, official immunity
doctrine is trans-substantive. Where recognized, it applies equally to suits
to enforce the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause, and every other justiciable provision of the Constitution.
Immunity’s trans-substantive character makes it a relatively crude tool for
defining or redefining packages of rights and enforcement mechanisms that
confer meaningful guarantees but are not intolerably costly.
Despite its trans-substantivity, official immunity doctrine is not, of
course, wholly inflexible. We can, and do, have different levels of
immunity, which can extend to officials performing different functions. It
is also possible for different immunity rules to apply to suits for damages,
on the one hand, and suits for injunctions, on the other. In thinking about
the roles that official immunity can play in achieving desirable alignments
6. See id. at 98–100.
7. See id. at 104–05 (appearing to treat rights as fixed and unchangeable once they have
been clearly established, despite the social costs of official and enterprise liability).
8. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 639 (2006).
9. See id. at 690–91.
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of substantive rights and mechanisms for enforcing them, we should
therefore attend more closely to the purposes that adjustments along these
dimensions might serve. At the same time, we should consider whether
alterations of other elements of overall packages of substantive rights,
causes of action, justiciability doctrines, and rules of pleading and proof
might better promote the same goals that current law relies on official
immunity to achieve.
My third goal in this Essay is to reconsider the question of how well the
traditional justifications for official immunity doctrines stand up once
official immunity is seen as one potential variable among others and its
distinctive features as a mechanism for doctrinal equilibration lie exposed.
My discussion of this question will be tentative, partly because many
potentially fruitful comparisons remain unexplored in the literature and
partly because much hinges on empirical questions that lack obvious
answers. I shall, however, highlight some items that belong on the agenda
for scholarly research.
My sharpest conclusion, overall, is that thinking about official immunity
ought to start largely afresh, with a willingness to follow analysis and
evidence where they lead. On one side of the debate as conventionally
framed, critics who believe that immunity only cheapens rights and want to
abolish it should think more carefully about what the consequences of
abolishing immunity might be. If deprived of official immunity as an
equilibrating mechanism, the U.S. Supreme Court might give us more
narrowly defined rights or fewer causes of action for constitutional
violations. On the other side of the debate, defenders of current doctrines
ought to recognize that immunity doctrine, as currently framed, rests on a
number of shaky assumptions. Immunity is a means, not an end, and there
has been too little thinking about whether there might be better tools for
achieving the same purposes. In this state of affairs, I shall advance more
questions than answers, but with confidence that framing the right questions
can be the first, crucial step down the path to enhanced understanding and
ultimately, one hopes, to better law.
I. THE EQUILIBRATION THESIS
Discussions of official immunity too often begin within an artificially
constricted frame. If we ask whether or when officials should have
immunity from suit, we characteristically assume all of the following
things: (1) the substantive content of constitutional rights is fixed; (2) the
applicable law creates a cause of action for damages or injunctions as a
mechanism for remedying rights violations; and (3) the party suing an
official has standing and otherwise presents a justiciable lawsuit.10 We
typically also assume that (4) the government cannot be sued for the
constitutional violations committed by its officials, or at least that a suit
against the government would not provide full compensation for a
10. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1820–24 (1991).
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constitutional wrong. 11 If the government could be sued for the full costs
resulting from constitutional violations, plaintiffs would have no incentive
to sue the officials too. Only against the background of these assumptions
do we conventionally address the desirability of official immunity or
consider it as a variable.
This mode of analysis is shallow and artificial. In an earlier article, I
advanced what I called the Equilibration Thesis to explain the relationship
among doctrines defining substantive rights, authorizing causes of action,
regulating the justiciability of claims, and governing judicial remedies.12
As noted above, the Equilibration Thesis holds that courts charged with
implementing constitutional rights or values sometimes view justiciability
doctrines, merits doctrines, and remedial doctrines as an integrated unit.13
Confronted with a situation in which they believe that the values underlying
constitutional rights are not adequately realized in practice, courts might
take any or all of the steps of expanding the definition of rights, expanding
the causes of action available to enforce rights, expanding standing, or
relaxing barriers to equitable or damages remedies. Conversely, when
courts regard the social costs of the existing bundle of rights and
enforcement mechanisms as excessive, they might consider calibrating
adjustments in any of the components of the package.
Several assumptions underlie the Equilibration Thesis. First, many and
possibly most constitutional rights are not clear and determinate Platonic
essences. 14 Rather, rights reflect values or interests, the sensible pursuit or
11. Both the federal government and the states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit,
except to the extent that they may choose to waive it. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F.
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841, 878 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
Although local governments do not possess sovereign immunity, see id. at 885, they are not
liable for their officials’ torts on a respondeat superior basis, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7, 691–94 (1978). Under cases decided subsequent to Monell,
the standards for establishing the liability of local governmental entities for constitutional
violations committed by their officials are exceedingly difficult to satisfy. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra, at 960–63 (summarizing Supreme Court decisions applying Monell).
12. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 637.
13. See id. The Equilibration Thesis is in substantial part a synthesis of work done by
others. A number of scholars have argued persuasively that views about the merits influence
judicial determinations of justiciability. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (arguing that standing should be understood as “a
question on the merits of plaintiff’s claim”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1474–75 (1998). Other scholars have
established that considerations involving acceptable remedies influence judicial
determinations of which rights to recognize and how to define them. See, e.g., SCHUCK,
supra note 2, at 25–28, 186; Gewirtz, supra note 1, at 678–79; Daryl Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889–99 (1999). My
earlier article demonstrated an additional linkage between concerns about acceptable
remedies and determinations of justiciability. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 648–83. Added to
the earlier work, this demonstration provided the necessary support for the Equilibration
Thesis, which holds that decisions about justiciability, the merits, and remedies are
pervasively interconnected.
14. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37–41 (2001)
(arguing that in addition to interpreting vague constitutional language, courts must frequently
develop and apply implementing tests and doctrines that are not directly traceable either to
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realization of which must depend on their interaction with other values or
interests. 15 Certainly liberty can be restricted for the sake of liberty. But
courts also appropriately take account of various practical and prudential
considerations, including social costs and benefits, when they interpret
language guaranteeing rights and develop implementing doctrines.16
Second, courts assess the social costs and benefits of defining particular
rights in particular ways in light of other surrounding, implementing rules,
policies, or doctrines, 17 and often feel as free to adjust implementing
doctrines as to adjust definitions of rights. 18 As noted already, courts that
regard the overall package of rights and implementing doctrines as
insufficiently robust may tend to adjust both rights and implementing
doctrines in the same expansive direction. For example, the Warren Court
not only extended substantive rights, but also relaxed justiciability bars and
revitalized the § 1983 cause of action.19 Similarly, courts that are
concerned about the costs of rights may seek not only to redefine the rights
themselves, but also to straiten surrounding doctrines bearing on rights’
enforcement. Supreme Court practice since the Warren years exemplifies
this phenomenon. Although more conservative Justices have sometimes
overruled or trimmed back Warren Court decisions establishing substantive
rights (while broadening other rights), much of their response to the Warren
legacy has come through heightened barriers to the judicial enforcement of
rights. The Court has thus expanded state sovereign immunity, 20 made it

the constitutional text or its originally understood meaning). Even many constitutional
originalists recognize a distinction between the interpretive function of identifying
constitutional meaning and the related, but distinct, task of doctrinal “construction.” See,
e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 118–21 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 6–7 (1999).
15. Philosophers as well as lawyers have so recognized. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Jr.,
Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 535–36
(1979).
16. See FALLON, supra note 14, at 47–52.
17. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 1, at 678–79; Levinson, supra note 13, at 889–90.
18. With respect to official immunity in particular, the Supreme Court was explicit in the
leading case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), that its previous decisions had
attempted a “balancing of competing values,” id. at 816, defined by public “policy,” id. at
813, and that it regarded it as an appropriate judicial function to adjust the applicable
standard in order to achieve its policy goals more successfully, see id. at 816–19; see also
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (recognizing that Harlow “completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law”
and that “we have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and
should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law”); Kit Kinports,
Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of
Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 120 (1991) (“As . . . interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the qualified immunity defense is not a matter of statutory construction, but instead is
a creature of policy . . . .”). But see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922–23 (1984) (asserting
that, absent precedent, the Court does “not have a license to establish immunities . . . in the
interests of . . . sound public policy”).
19. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 687–88.
20. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
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difficult to establish constitutional violations by cities and counties,21
selectively stiffened justiciability doctrines,22 cut back on the Bivens23
cause of action for damages against federal officials who have violated
constitutional rights,24 and elevated the burdens of pleading in suits against
government officials. 25
The most interesting equilibrating adjustments, however, are those in
which courts have imposed limits on remedial or enforcement mechanisms
as part of an overall strategy that includes the expansion—rather than the
contraction—of previously recognized substantive rights. For example, the
Warren Court loosely construed applicable equitable principles to establish
that the school desegregation mandated by Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown I) 26 need not commence immediately, but could proceed with “all
deliberate speed.” 27 Historical evidence establishes that some of the
Justices would not have agreed to Brown I’s substantive holding in the
absence of this remedial equilibration.28 The Warren Court also developed
non-retroactivity doctrines under which its more sweeping expansions of
the rights of criminal suspects did not apply to previously adjudicated
cases. 29 In the absence of such doctrines, the Court would almost certainly
have been deterred from rendering some of its path-breaking decisions
broadening the rights of criminal defendants, such as that in Miranda v.
Arizona. 30 Professor Jeffries has more generally defended the qualified
immunity doctrine that protects government officers from suits from
damages unless they have violated “clearly established” rights as
facilitating the expansion of previously recognized guarantees. 31
In asserting that courts do and should feel free to adjust a variety of
variables to achieve optimal packages of rights and surrounding doctrines, I
do not mean to imply that courts can make any adjustments that they might
think desirable on policy grounds. Courts function subject to a variety of
role-based constraints, including obligations to act in conformity with
constitutional and statutory language, to adhere to precedent in the absence
of strong reasons to do otherwise, and to maintain a body of law that
generally respects settled expectations. 32 Indeed, as something of a legal
21. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 482–84 (2002).
22. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 688–89.
23. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
24. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 735–40 (describing “retrenchment[s]” that
“have given . . . reason to doubt Bivens’ continuing vitality”).
25. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1939 (2009); see also infra notes 135–38.
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
28. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 312–13 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 293 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 618 (1965); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1738–44.
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 97–105.
32. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the
Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1127–28 (2008) (arguing
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“doctrinalist,” I am disposed to be sharply critical of judicial decisions that
disingenuously misapply pertinent sources of legal authority. Nevertheless,
as the Supreme Court’s historical pattern of doctrinal adjustment helps to
establish, role-based obligations by no means eliminate the Justices’
capacity and indeed their obligation to exercise reasoned judgment in the
pursuit of a well-designed overall alignment of rights, justiciability
doctrines, causes of action, and immunity doctrines.
The third assumption that underlies the Equilibration Thesis may be
implicit in what I have said already: the tools by which courts seek
doctrinal equilibration should not be viewed as inherently suspect simply
because they preclude some remedies or create obstacles to the enforcement
of rights in some cases. We may, for example, be better off with relatively
broadly defined rights that are enforceable only through suits for
injunctions, or in the context of criminal prosecutions, than we would be
with more narrowly defined rights that were also enforceable through suits
for damages.
II. DOCTRINAL EQUILIBRATION AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
It takes no intellectual heavy lifting to establish that official immunity
doctrines perform an equilibrating function by diminishing the social costs
that constitutional rights would have if officers who violated them were
always strictly liable in suits for damages. The Supreme Court cited some
of the relevant considerations in the leading case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald33:
[I]t cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant
officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs include the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will
“dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” 34

With the diminution of social costs being official immunity doctrines’
declared purpose, the most fundamental question about official immunity, it
is usually thought, is whether—in light of the assumptions that the scope of
a constitutional right has been defined and that the law grants the plaintiff
an unalterable cause of action—a deviation from the ideal of an individually
effective remedy for every constitutional violation can be justified. As the
Equilibration Thesis reveals, however, this question rests on a false
premise. It is a mistake, in thinking about immunity, to assume that in a
world without immunity, other legal doctrines—including those defining
rights and furnishing causes of action—would remain as they now are. We
will get a better picture of the role that immunity plays in our constitutional
that the concept of a “rule of recognition” helps to explain the nature of constitutional law
and judicial constraint and obligation).
33. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
34. Id. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
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scheme if we try to imagine a world without official immunity of any kind.
Would a legal regime without official immunity be better or worse than the
one we have now? 35
The difficulty in answering this question arises because it is impossible,
as a practical matter, to imagine a world without official immunity in which
nothing else changes. Even critics of current immunity doctrine so
recognize. When they contemplate a world in which some or all officials
lack immunity, they anticipate two changes, both of which they
understandably regard as desirable. First, victims of constitutional rights
violations who now go uncompensated would receive compensation.36
Second, threats of individual liability would deter a number of
constitutional violations that otherwise would have occurred.37 I once
imagined a third change that I also thought normatively attractive: the
abolition of official immunity would effectively force governments to
indemnify their officials. 38 Otherwise, I reasoned, too many people would
be deterred from entering government service. If so, a de facto regime of
strict governmental liability for injuries caused by officials’ constitutional
violations would not only ensure compensation to victims, but also create
powerful incentives for the government to take greater care to train and
supervise its employees. 39
In light of the Equilibration Thesis, however, it now seems to me deeply
mistaken to think that we can realistically imagine a world in which official
immunity doctrines were abolished and in which further, equilibrating
adjustments—which critics of immunity doctrine would find less
welcome—did not also occur. To put the point succinctly, the social costs
of rights and causes of action that have led the courts to develop immunity
doctrines in our actual world would impel other, compensating changes in
the law if immunity were abolished. The easiest changes to imagine would
involve the nature and scope of causes of action to recover damages for
constitutional violations. If, for example, it would be unfair and
excessively costly to have judges be suable for damages whenever they
ruled erroneously on a constitutional claim, or to have legislators be
answerable for damages whenever they enacted statutes that a court
subsequently held unconstitutional, courts might hold that no cause of
action runs against judges when they have done no more than rule
erroneously or against legislators when they have done no more than enact
35. I continue to assume that the government could not be sued in its own name.
Without this assumption, as I explained above, the question of official immunity would have
no independent significance. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive
Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 498 n.5 (1992);
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53,
126–27.
37. See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 36, at 498; Johns, supra note 36, at 127–28.
38. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1823. Others have reached similar
conclusions. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results
of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76 (1999)
(summarizing the argument to this effect and citing sources).
39. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1823.
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an unconstitutional statute. Indeed, one might well think of official
immunity as limiting the scope of causes of action for damages relief in just
this way.
The suggestion that immunity doctrines currently function as de facto
limits on causes of action to enforce constitutional rights of course depends
on the possibility of a distinction between causes of action to sue for
damages, which immunity doctrines frequently block, and causes of action
to sue for injunctions, which official immunity bars much less frequently.
But such a distinction already exists in actions against federal officials. In a
development conventionally traced to Ex parte Young,40 the Supreme Court
has taken it for granted that the Constitution creates, or that courts should
recognize, causes of action to sue for injunctive relief against ongoing
constitutional violations.41 By contrast, absent a statutory authorization to
sue, the Court has emphatically not assumed that the Constitution grants, or
that courts should routinely uphold, causes of action for damages arising
As a result, there are frequently
from constitutional violations.42
constitutional causes of action to sue for injunctions when no cause of
action to sue for damages would exist.
If I am right that immunity doctrines and limitations on causes of action
frequently can serve as functional equivalents, in a world without
immunity, the availability of Bivens actions against federal officials who
violate constitutional rights might shrink even further.43 The Court has
already made plain that a damages remedy for constitutional violations “is
not an automatic entitlement” and that “in most instances . . . a Bivens
remedy [is] unjustified.” 44 Without official immunity, the Court might
begin to interpret § 1983, too, so that it would provide a cause of action to
sue for damages for only a subset of constitutional violations. Recognition
of one or more non-textual exceptions to the statute would not be wholly
unprecedented. The Court has already held that § 1983 creates no cause of
action for damages for constitutional violations occurring in the
administration of state tax schemes. 45

40. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
41. John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008), offers the revisionist
view that the cause of action upheld in Young derived from the common law, not the
Constitution, id. at 990. Even if Professor Harrison is correct, there is no doubt that
constitutional causes of action to sue for injunctive relief are now routinely upheld. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1111–13
(2010).
42. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
43. On post-Bivens retrenchments that have occurred already, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 11, at 735–40.
44. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.
45. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719 (1996) (citing Fair
Assessment in Real Estate, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107 (1981)) (characterizing
McNary, which had held that federal courts were barred from granting relief in a damages
action against local officials alleged to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
assessing taxes unequally, as a decision “about the scope of the § 1983 cause of action, not
abstention doctrines”).
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Perhaps, however, the Court would regard judicial recognition of a series
of non-textual exceptions to § 1983 as overreaching the judicial role. If so,
in a world in which the absence of official immunity opened the door to
damages relief for all constitutional violations—including those committed
in good faith by judges, prosecutors, and legislators—I think it more likely
than not that Congress would amend the statute to narrow the § 1983 cause
of action. As the history of Bivens doctrine suggests, the absence of a cause
of action for damages relief for all deprivations of constitutional rights by
federal officials has not been thought unconstitutional. 46 If there are any
situations in which the Constitution specifically and uniquely mandates the
availability of damages remedies, there do not appear to be many. 47
As another possible response to a world without official immunity, the
Supreme Court might diminish the scope of at least some substantive
constitutional rights. Indeed, I think I can identify cases in which the Court
has already trimmed the scope of constitutional rights for the purpose of
stemming what it has regarded as an undue flood of suits for damages into
federal court.
Expressing concerns that the Due Process Clause should not become a
font of tort law, the Court held in Paul v. Davis 48 that a plaintiff whose
name and photograph had been included in a police flyer identifying active
shoplifters had not alleged an actionable due process violation because mere
harm to reputation does not count as a deprivation of constitutionally
protected “liberty.” 49 Paul’s narrow interpretation of the due process right,
which found little support in prior decisions, 50 was almost certainly
“motivated by concerns about the section 1983 remedy” and the social costs
of “the wholesale federalization of tort claims against state and local
government officials and the corresponding prospect of massive damages
liability.” 51
The Court further narrowed its interpretation of constitutionally protected
due process rights, apparently in response to the same concern, in Parratt v.
Taylor, 52 which held that random and unauthorized deprivations of liberty
and property do not violate the Due Process Clause unless and until a state
has failed to provide post-deprivation corrective process.53 Again voicing
concerns about the social costs of permitting § 1983 and the Due Process
Clause to become fonts of tort law, the Court pared back the scope of
previously recognized due process rights once more in Daniels v.

46. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1779–87.
47. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 740–41.
48. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
49. Id. at 697, 712–14.
50. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405,
423–29 (1977); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 293, 324–28 (1976).
51. Levinson, supra note 13, at 893.
52. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
53. Id. at 543–44.
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Williams, 54 which held that merely negligent deprivations of liberty and
property do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 55
With the Court having shrunk the scope of the due process guarantee in
Paul, Parratt, and Daniels, it is easy to imagine the Justices similarly
circumscribing other rights if, in the absence of official immunity, they
regarded the social costs of damages actions as too high. For example, the
Court could plausibly respond to a flood of suits seeking damages for
unreasonable searches and seizures by holding that if any reasonable person
could think a search reasonable, it is not unreasonable.56
Even if some rights shrank in the absence of official immunity, it is of
course hard to imagine that all rights would do so. Nor have I meant to
suggest that all causes of action that are now barred by official immunity
would necessarily be recalibrated to a point of extensional equivalence with
the current regime. To the contrary, it seems undeniable that the
availability of official immunity sometimes makes a difference, even if the
central premises of the Equilibration Thesis are accepted. Nevertheless, the
thought experiment of trying to imagine a world without official immunity
persuades me that if courts and other decision makers were deprived of
official immunity as an equilibrating device, they would at least sometimes
turn to other tools in an effort to reduce the overall social costs of packages
of rights and surrounding doctrines. Some of the results might be better
than those that official immunity now produces, but others might prove
worse.
If so, then we should begin to see official immunity not as an inherently
regrettable doctrine, but as a tool that can be used wisely or unwisely in
efforts to promote ends that we should sometimes judge more laudable than
deplorable. In particular, we should recognize the possibility that official
immunity doctrine could serve goals that those who favor broadly defined
rights should endorse.
III. THE NATURE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AS A TOOL OF EQUILIBRATION
So far, I have spoken generally about the potential value of official
immunity as an equilibrating mechanism, but I have not examined the
peculiar features in light of which we should assess its attractiveness
relative to other doctrines. This part offers a preliminary survey and
appraisal. To summarize my conclusions at the outset, among official
immunity’s most striking features is its trans-substantive character, which
makes it a blunt tool for achieving doctrinal equilibration. Nevertheless,
immunity doctrine is not wholly inflexible. Elements of flexibility come
from its potentially variable applicability to suits for injunctions and suits

54. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
55. Id. at 335–36.
56. Cf. Levinson, supra note 13, at 915 (“In a world where damages for every
unreasonable search were potentially enormous, the Fourth Amendment guidelines for what
counts as reasonable would likely become both broader and, to create safe harbors for police
attempting in good faith to follow the rules, clearer and more precise.”).
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for damages, and its capacity to adjust the degree of officials’ protection
against suit on a function-sensitive basis.
A. Trans-substantive Character
Earlier, I said that official immunity operates so much like a limit on
causes of action that it could be so conceptualized for some purposes. But
whereas causes of action are often defined in substantive terms—
establishing entitlements to seek redress for violations of particular rights—
immunity doctrine does not, for example, operate as a distinctive limit on
rights to sue for First Amendment or Equal Protection Clause violations.
Rather, it establishes a trans-substantive barrier to suits against particular
officials, regardless of the constitutional provision that those officials
allegedly violated. Perhaps this feature of official immunity doctrine
should not be viewed as unalterable. In theory, it would be possible for the
Supreme Court (or Congress) to make immunity—or the degree of
immunity that an official can claim—depend on the right that the official
allegedly violated. The Court, however, has never taken this approach. At
the very least, trans-substantivity is a feature of official immunity doctrine
as we have always known it.
The trans-substantive character of immunity doctrine makes it a poor tool
for attempting to achieve an equilibration of the values underlying
particular rights and the social costs of enforcing them. A trans-substantive
immunity must be defended instead on the ground that some of the social
costs inherent in the enforcement of rights vary so little from right to right
that they can be addressed most efficiently on an across-the-board basis. I
shall consider this possibility slightly more fully below.57
B. Flexibility Along Other Dimensions
Although official immunity is utterly inflexible along the dimension of
trans-substantivity, it has notable elements of flexibility along other
dimensions.
1. Potentially Variable Applicability to Damages and Injunctions
Although the range of potential remedies for official misconduct is
enormously broad, damages and injunctions rank among the most
familiar. 58 Among official immunity doctrines’ elements of flexibility, they
can apply differentially to suits for damages and suits for injunctions.59 For
the most part, the Supreme Court has placed little reliance on immunity

57. See infra Part IV.F.
58. In Henry Hart’s celebrated formulation, “Congress necessarily has a wide choice in
the selection of remedies, and . . . a complaint about action [substituting one for another] can
rarely be of constitutional dimension.” Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366
(1953).
59. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995, 1007–11.
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doctrines to bar injunctive remedies. 60 Although the rule once was
otherwise, the Court increasingly appears to regard injunctive relief against
ongoing constitutional violations as being—at least in many contexts—the
most appropriate if not minimally necessary remedy to give vitality to
constitutional guarantees.61
If one accepts the premise that injunctions are normally (even if not
always) an appropriate or even constitutionally necessary remedy, any
trans-substantive barrier to injunctive relief obviously looks undesirable. In
cases involving suits for injunctions, the Court has therefore relied more on
other doctrines to mitigate some of the social costs that broad packages of
rights and remedies would otherwise entail. These include equitable
barriers to the award of injunctions under some circumstances 62 and
standing and ripeness doctrines. 63
For various reasons, however, none of these other mechanisms is well
suited to reducing the social costs of suits for damages. For example,
equitable principles do not apply to damages actions, 64 and parties who
seek damages for past injuries almost never encounter difficulties in
satisfying the demands of standing doctrine. 65 The juxtaposition of official
immunity in damages actions with non-immunity in suits for injunctions
does not reflect a necessary pairing. Official immunity doctrines bar suits
for injunctions as well as damages against some officials under some
circumstances. 66 Nevertheless, among the Supreme Court’s most recurring
strategies of doctrinal equilibration is coupling official immunity from suits
for damages with non-immunity in suits for injunctions.
2. Degrees of Official Immunity: Absolute and Qualified
Official immunity need not be all or nothing. So-called absolute
immunity confers inviolable protection against liability in the suits to which

60. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 108 (“In general, constitutional tort actions against state
officers for manifestly official misconduct are routinely allowed . . . .”).
61. See Fallon, supra note 41, at 1111–13.
62. Among the most significant are the Pullman and Younger abstention doctrines,
which take their names, respectively, from Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For discussion of the
Pullman doctrine, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1057–83; for a discussion of
Younger abstention, see id. at 1083–1128.
63. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983) (invoking
standing doctrine as a barrier to a suit seeking injunctive relief); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 493–99 (1974) (holding a suit for equitable relief against an array of local officials
nonjusticiable).
64. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996).
65. See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (holding that a party who had suffered a past injury
had standing to sue for damages but not injunctive relief).
66. The Supreme Court has held clearly that officials acting in a legislative capacity are
normally immune from suits seeking to enjoin them in that capacity. See Supreme Court of
Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732–34 (1980); Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502–03 (1975). For a discussion of the scope of this
immunity, and of the possibility that the President might have immunity from suits for
injunctions, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1007–11.
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it applies. 67 But there can be less than absolute or what the Supreme Court
The Court currently
has characterized as “qualified” immunity. 68
recognizes just one type of qualified immunity, which, where it exists,
defeats suits for damages unless an official violated “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” 69 All else being equal, absolute immunity more sharply
diminishes both the value of rights and the social costs of their enforcement
than does qualified immunity.
In theory, it would be possible for the Court to introduce multiple tiers of
immunity, or to have the degree of available immunity rise or fall along a
sliding scale. The Court apparently contemplated such an approach in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 70 when it said that “in varying scope, a qualified
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and the
responsibilities of the [defendant’s] office.” 71 Professor Schuck has also
advocated a variability of this kind.72 Although this approach surely
deserves consideration, it has proven challenging for the courts to
administer even the single qualified immunity standard that the Supreme
Court articulated in Harlow. 73 At least since Harlow, the Court has applied
that single standard invariantly to all executive officials to whom it has not
extended absolute immunity. 74
3. Potential for Function-Based Application
With the Supreme Court having recognized official immunity of just two
rigid types, it has of course needed to determine which defendant officials
receive which. The Court does so based not on officials’ titles or their
location in a particular branch of government, but according to their
functions. 75 To oversimplify slightly, the Court has held that officials sued
for performing judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial functions possess
absolute immunity from damages liability. 76 Officials performing nearly all
other functions receive qualified immunity. 77
Whether function-based distinctions among levels of official immunity
promote optimal packages of rights and implementing doctrines obviously
rests on a complex mix of empirical and normative considerations. I cannot
pause even to list, much less to probe, all of them here. But two
67. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995.
68. See id.
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
70. 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
71. Id.; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975) (articulating
immunity principles applicable to school board members).
72. See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 56.
73. 457 U.S. 800.
74. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995 (describing the qualified
immunity standard and contrasting it with absolute immunity).
75. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810–11; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 995.
76. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 811.
77. See id. at 807 (“[Q]ualified immunity represents the norm.”).
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assumptions seem especially central: officials performing some functions
are more likely to be the targets of greater numbers of distracting, yet
ultimately meritless, suits than are officials performing other functions;78
and constitutional violations by judges and prosecutors are more likely to be
deterred and adequately remedied by mechanisms that immunity does not
displace, such as dismissals of indictments and reversals on appeal, than are
violations by officials performing other functions. 79
If we provisionally grant the validity of these assumptions, and further
assume that there will be two tiers of immunity doctrine—absolute and
qualified—then official immunity doctrine affords the Court three viable
modes of doctrinal adjustment. First, the Court can expand or contract the
range of functions for which officials possess absolute rather than qualified
immunity. It did so, for example, when it held that the President was
entitled to absolute immunity in the performance of all presidential
functions in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. 80 The Court has also made a number of
consequential decisions about which functions are sufficiently prosecutorial
and judicial to merit absolute immunity. 81
Second, the Court could contract the range of functions for which
officials receive any immunity at all. Although qualified immunity now
seems firmly entrenched, matters were apparently otherwise for much of
early American history. 82 Indeed, it was not until 1967, in Pierson v.
Ray, 83 that the Supreme Court expressly held an executive official immune
from damages liability for a constitutional (as distinguished from a common

78. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
80. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
81. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (determining that a judge
acted in a non-judicial capacity when firing a probation officer); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 520–21 (1985) (holding that the Attorney General does not act in a prosecutorial
capacity when authorizing a warrantless national security wiretap).
82. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 150 (1851) (affirming
damages award against U.S. military officer for wrongful confiscation of plaintiff’s goods
and rejecting military necessity defense); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179
(1804) (holding a Navy captain personally liable for unlawfully seizing a Danish vessel
despite his having acted under presidential orders). An important recent study, James F.
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 (2010),
concludes that federal officials generally enjoyed no immunity from suit during the
antebellum era, but that Congress routinely provided indemnification for official action taken
in good faith discharge of official duties, see id. at 1924–26. For other valuable discussions
of early practice involving official immunity and liability, see David P. Currie, Sovereign
Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 149, 149–56; David E.
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 5–40 (1972) (tracing the history of official immunity doctrine, including its roots in
English common law); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 553–57 (2003);
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19–39 (1963); and Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and
Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414–17 (1987) (examining the prevalence of
actions against officers in the early nineteenth century).
83. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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law) violation. 84 The prospect that some officials might have no immunity
from damages actions is thus not wholly unimaginable.
Third, the Court could adjust the standard by which it defines qualified
immunity. Although that formula has remained relatively untouched in
recent decades, the Court made a major adjustment in its now canonical
1982 decision in Harlow. Prior to Harlow, officials received immunity
only insofar as they acted with both objective reasonableness and subjective
good faith. 85 Harlow extended the protective shield of official immunity to
all officials who do not violate clearly established rights, regardless of their
motivations. 86 According to Harlow, permitting suits against officials
whenever plaintiffs alleged that they had acted with subjective bad faith
gave rise to excessively high social costs. 87
4. Potential to Link Liability to Clearly Established Rights
As the currently applicable qualified immunity formula illustrates, it is
possible to deploy official immunity to bar suits in cases in which the law
was not previously clearly established, but to allow suits in cases where
clearly established rights were violated. This potential usage obviously
makes official immunity doctrines attractive as tools for doctrinal
equilibration insofar as one could justifiably believe that the clarity with
which rights were previously established bears importantly on any of a
number of questions. These include: the appropriate balance to strike
between deterring officials from violating rights, on the one hand, and
chilling officials from acting conscientiously to discharge their
responsibilities, on the other hand; 88 the fairness of assessing liability for
violations of rights when their applicability to new facts was not readily
foreseeable; 89 and the incentives and constraints that courts should be made
to consider when asked to resolve a previously doubtful constitutional
question by either upholding or rejecting a claim of right.90
Whether the clarity with which rights are established does in fact bear
importantly on these matters obviously hinges on a number of empirical and
normative assumptions. Although I shall not pause to examine those
assumptions here, their validity will emerge as an important topic of
discussion in Part IV.
84. Id. at 557.
85. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (affirming that immunity would
be defeated if an official acted “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury”).
86. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
87. Among these, the Court emphasized “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of
official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office,” and “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in
original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
88. See, e.g., id. at 817–19.
89. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on
the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 96–101 (1989).
90. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 97–110.
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C. The Difficulty of Assessing the Comparative Attractiveness
of Official Immunity
Rigorous assessment of the attractiveness of official immunity as a
mechanism of doctrinal equilibration would obviously include a
comparative aspect. A decision maker assessing immunity doctrine as a
tool of doctrinal equilibration would ideally consult a menu of other
options, supplemented by sound appraisals of the capacities of other
mechanisms, to achieve an optimal balance of the social costs and benefits
of constitutional rights and surrounding doctrines. Unfortunately, however,
the work needed to ground good comparative judgments in every case
would be Herculean, far beyond the capacities of actual judges and
scholars. Indeed, one well might doubt whether courts or other decision
makers could know even a small fraction of what they would ideally know
in order to make good judgments about whether and how to employ official
immunity doctrine in light of the Equilibration Thesis.
This recognition should by no means disable further analysis. The need
to make decisions based on imperfect information is endemic not only to
the judicial function, but also to the human condition more generally. The
crucial point is thus a simple one: in thinking about the attractiveness of
official immunity in light of the Equilibration Thesis, we should look
imaginatively for better mechanisms for achieving immunity doctrine’s
purposes.
IV. THE EFFICACY OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AS A TOOL
FOR ACHIEVING IDENTIFIED PURPOSES
Having examined some of the distinctive features of official immunity as
a tool for adjusting the value and social costs of overall packages of rights
and enforcement mechanisms, in this part I shall critically examine a
number of claims sometimes made about the desirability of immunity
doctrines in damages actions. 91 A recurrent theme will be that although the
leading justifications of official immunity doctrine frequently depend on
projected consequences—involving how immunity or its absence would
shape official behavior—we currently lack much of the information that
would aid crucially in making informed projections.
A. Optimizing the Balance Between Benefits of Deterrence
and Costs of Chilling
In Harlow, the Supreme Court postulated that an important purpose of
immunity doctrine is to strike the right balance between deterring officials
from violating constitutional rights and avoiding an undue chilling of
conscientious officials from the fearless discharge of their duties. 92 In
recalibrating the qualified immunity standard in light of this goal, the Court
91. The limitation of my inquiry to damages actions reflects considerations of relative
importance, not logical necessity. As I said above, official immunity doctrines could, and
sometimes do, apply in suits for injunctions as well as in suits for damages.
92. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819; see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
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relied heavily on the assumption that officials, absent immunity, would face
the threat of personal liability for constitutional violations committed in the
ostensible performance of their official duties.93 Yet this assumption is by
no means obviously correct. To the contrary, most scholars appear to
believe that many, and perhaps most, officials are indemnified by their
employers for some or all constitutional violations for which they might be
sued. 94
In assessments of whether official immunity doctrine is well designed to
achieve its purposes, the question of indemnification practices holds large
potential significance. Officials would indubitably respond differently to
the prospect of governmental liability than they would to the threat of
personal liability. Yet, roughly thirty years after Harlow, no good empirical
study has sought to establish the pervasiveness and scope of governmental
indemnification. 95 This gap in empirical knowledge crucially handicaps
instrumental analysis. If indemnification occurs routinely, the prospect of
needing to pay judgments against officials might motivate governments to
establish training and deterrent mechanisms of their own 96—a consideration
that I mentioned earlier and shall examine more closely below.
Nevertheless, the calculation necessary to set the immunity standard at the
right level to achieve an optimal balance between deterring constitutional
violations and unduly chilling conscientious official action would need to
be far more complex than the analysis that the Court performed in Harlow.
Another assumption underlying the Harlow standard is that officials can
reasonably be expected to keep abreast of appellate court decisions clearly
establishing applicable law. 97 This assumption also seems questionable, at
least in the absence of a demonstration that government agencies provide
officials who are not lawyers with continuing education. If government
entities routinely indemnify their officials, they would certainly have an
incentive to provide those officials with training regarding applicable law,
including court decisions.98 But just as we cannot confidently claim to
93. See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 56 (emphasizing the significance of this threat).
94. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 50 & n.16 (1998) (reporting on the basis of “personal experience” and
anecdotal evidence that “[t]he state or local government officer who is acting within the
scope of his or her employment in something other than extreme bad faith can count on
governmental defense and indemnification”); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity:
Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2000) (reporting
that indemnification is “generally thought to be widespread”). But cf. SCHUCK, supra note 2,
at 85 (describing indemnification as “neither certain nor universal”).
95. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 108 (1999)
(surveying debates about the prevalence of indemnification and calling for an empirical
study).
96. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980); SCHUCK, supra
note 2, at 102–06; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1823.
97. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19 (postulating that “a reasonably competent public
official should know the law governing his conduct”).
98. Cf. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 82, at 1922–24 (suggesting that during the
antebellum era, federal officials generally had no immunity from damages actions, but that
Congress routinely provided indemnification for official action taken in good faith discharge
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know how widely indemnification occurs, we might doubt how well we
understand how the availability of indemnification would affect the
incentives of high level officials to implement continuing education
programs for lower level employees. Among other reasons for uncertainty,
Daryl Levinson has raised important questions about whether governmental
bodies—which are not-for-profit enterprises—respond to threats of
government liability in the same way as individuals or corporate officers
would respond to threats of personal or corporate liability. 99
Although gaps in current learning make it difficult to make good
comparisons between official immunity doctrines and other possible
mechanisms for achieving the optimal calibration between the benefits of
deterring constitutional violations and the costs of chilling conscientious
officials, alternative or complementary strategies deserve consideration.
Two may suffice as examples.
First, it might be desirable to reconsider current doctrines that largely
shield governments from direct liability for their officials’ wrongs,
especially if empirical studies were to establish that government employers
routinely indemnify their officials anyway. 100 I said above that I did not
think that across-the-board strict liability would be feasible or attractive in
light of the Equilibration Thesis. To repeat what seems to me to be a clear
example, it is nearly unimaginable that the government should have to pay
damages every time a judge erroneously deprives someone of a claimed
constitutional right, even if the error is corrected on appeal. Nevertheless, a
more limited regime of government liability could imaginably improve the
current balance between deterrence of violations and chilling of
conscientious action by creating better incentives for improved hiring,
training, and supervision. 101
of official duties, and that this arrangement left responsibility for adjusting incentives for
official action with Congress).
99. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2000); see also SCHUCK,
supra note 2, at 125 (asserting that “our understanding of how bureaucracies behave is so
rudimentary” that it is difficult to predict how changes in legal liability rules would affect
behavior). But see Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 858–59 (2001) (asserting that
tort remedies effectively deter governmental misconduct). It also might matter whether
indemnifying institutions rely on insurance or self-insurance to pay judgments against their
officials and, if the latter, to what extent the consequences of an adverse judgment against a
police officer, for example, would be felt distinctively within the police department that had
failed to deter the officer’s wrongdoing, rather than being spread across the entirety of a
municipal budget.
100. For proposals to this effect, see, for example, SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 100–21;
Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50
U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 1000–07 (1989).
101. See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 100–13 (advocating such an approach). As Larry
Kramer and Alan Sykes have argued, the relevant calculations in designing an ideal liability
regime would be complex, depending on such considerations as whether officials possess the
personal resources to pay judgments against them and on transaction costs, including those
necessary to negotiate contracts with indemnification provisions. See Larry Kramer & Alan
O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP.
CT. REV. 249, 272–94. They very plausibly conclude, however, that government liability is
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Insofar as cities and counties—which do not possess sovereign
immunity—are concerned, reforms of this character would need to involve
two elements. On the one hand, either the Supreme Court or Congress
would have to revisit and overturn decisions that have categorically rejected
respondeat superior liability and made municipalities’ causal responsibility
for their officials’ torts virtually impossible to establish. 102 On the other
hand, the Court or Congress would need to establish exactly what
municipalities could be liable for—if not, once again, for the damage
occasioned by every constitutional violation committed by every
government official, including every erroneous judicial ruling and every
attempt by a prosecutor to enforce a statute that a court subsequently holds
unconstitutional. Although a myriad of important details would need to be
worked out, establishing sensible standards of municipal liability would
almost certainly require displacement of the holding of Owen v. City of
Independence 103 that municipalities cannot claim any good faith or
comparable immunity from damages claims when plaintiffs state otherwise
valid causes of action.104 It might, for example, be desirable to permit
otherwise suable entities to benefit in litigation from having good internal
mechanisms for training their officials to respect constitutional norms and
for disciplining those who run amok. 105
Where the constitutional violations of state employees are at stake, the
Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence may be too deeply
entrenched for us currently to imagine a judicially mandated transition from

likely to produce better deterrence and training than officer liability when the officers are
judgment-proof. See id. at 276–87. (I add the qualification that Kramer and Sykes have
“very plausibly” reached their conclusions because of empirical uncertainties about whether
public officials making decisions involving potential expenditures of public money have the
same incentives as officers of private, for-profit corporations. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text.) Where significant transaction costs exist, Kramer and Sykes also
recommend that government liability should be limited to cases involving negligent
supervision and training. See Kramer & Sykes, supra, at 287–94.
102. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397 (1997), which two other Justices joined, called for consideration of this course.
See id. at 430–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
104. Id. at 638.
105. In the partly analogous case of “hostile environment” suits against employers under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, an employer is “‘subject to vicarious liability . . . for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with . . . authority over the
employee,’” but the employer has an affirmative defense when it “‘exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any’ discriminatory conduct and ‘the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.’” Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2009) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). Studies cited by the Court suggest that this affirmative
defense has “prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating,
preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct” and that “[e]mployers are thus subject to
a strong inducement to ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their
operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability.” Id.
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officer to state liability, 106 at least in the short term. Congress, however,
suffers from no precedent-based incapacity. Acting pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could strip the states of sovereign
immunity from suits predicated on their officials’ constitutional
violations. 107 If it did so, it could provide for state liability based on
whatever kind of fault it might deem appropriate. It could also, if it so
chose, create a statutory exception to the otherwise available federal cause
of action for cases in which state law establishes an adequate alternative
compensation system—which could potentially be one with sensible limits
on punitive or even compensatory damages. 108
In offering vague suggestions such as these, I make no pretense of having
established what a preferable alternative to our current official immunity
regime would look like, or even of having shown that a preferable
alternative necessarily exists. Grave difficulties could potentially arise in
efforts to work out details. For example, if judicial determinations of entity
liability would require fine-grained assessments of the adequacy of training,
supervision, and disciplinary mechanisms that courts are ill-equipped to
make, then the evident manageability of a formula that predicates liability
on the presence or absence of clearly established law might look better by
comparison. 109 I do not exclude this possibility. It seems clear, however,
that the assumptions underlying the current regime of official liability
subject to Harlow’s “clearly established law” standard are sufficiently
doubtful that scholars could profitably consider the potential superiority of
alternative mechanisms for achieving an optimal balance between
deterrence of constitutional violations and chill of conscientious official
action.110
A second possible mechanism for improving the calibration between
deterring constitutional violations and avoiding undue chilling of publicspirited action is far easier to describe, at least in concept. In crafting
doctrine, the Supreme Court should avoid the kind of complexity that
would make it unreasonable to expect officials to know where
constitutional boundaries lie. The rule of law may not inherently require a
law of rules, 111 but it is surely more reasonable to expect officials to know
and comply with broad, clear rules than it is to expect them to keep up with
a flow of judicial opinions that clarify the law only from the perspective of
legal specialists. Existing doctrine partly reflects this recognition. When
106. See David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 947–56 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s decisions,
although erroneous, should be accepted on grounds of stare decisis).
107. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006).
108. Cf. Oren, supra note 100, at 1006.
109. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006) (discussing judicially manageable
standards as a requisite for judicial decision making).
110. For a broad-based and thoughtful attack on judicial decision making predicated on
this likely fiction, see Pillard, supra note 38.
111. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1176 (1989).
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the controlling tests of constitutional validity take the form of vague
standards, the correct application of which depends on nuanced
determinations, the Court makes it difficult for plaintiffs to show that
“clearly established” law governs their cases: it insists that “the right the
official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a
. . . particularized . . . sense.” 112 Insofar as legal complexity tends to
support claims of official immunity, more sharply etched doctrines could
thus serve better both to deter official misconduct and to ensure
compensation to victims.
However one judges these proposals, two things seem clear. First, we
could make far better judgments of how well qualified immunity serves the
function of getting the right balance between deterrence of constitutional
violations and chill of conscientious official action if we had better
empirical information. Second, given that immunity will always be an
imperfect device, we ought to consider other possible mechanisms that
would either complement official immunity or perform its intended
functions better.
B. Limiting Liability to Cases of Moral Entitlement to Compensation
The Supreme Court has frequently suggested that it would be unfair to
hold officials liable if they could not reasonably have known that their
conduct would violate constitutional rights. 113 Going a step further,
Professor Jeffries argues that a fault system is preferable to a strict liability
regime as a matter of fairness. 114 He additionally claims that the currently
prevailing immunity doctrines create a reasonable approximation of faultbased liability, especially through the qualified immunity standard of
Harlow. 115 Even if we were to grant the assumption that Jeffries is right
about the desirability of a fault system, absolute immunity sometimes bars
recovery in cases in which fault unquestionably exists. What is more, even
qualified immunity seems overbroad insofar as it protects officials who act
with subjective bad faith and violate constitutional rights. But these are
obvious points. No one denies that immunity doctrine bars recovery in
some cases of fault. The question is whether the desirability of a fault
system justifies the main outlines of our current immunity regime, not all of
its details, some of which might of course be justifiable on other grounds
anyway.
With the inquiry focused in this way, the two basic questions are whether
Jeffries is right that a fault system is preferable to a strict liability regime
and whether we currently have a structure of immunity and liability rules
that is mostly fault-based in the morally relevant sense. The answers are
not obvious. In the most characteristic situations in which the law makes
fault a condition of liability—such as under the negligence standard in
112.
113.
114.
115.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
See Jeffries, supra note 89, at 95–96.
See id. at 97–99.
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private tort law—the law also defines the parties’ rights and duties by
reference to negligence. 116 If non-negligent conduct violates no one’s
rights, it is easy to see why a party who acted without fault, and thus
violated no one’s rights, should have no moral duty of compensation. By
contrast, the “clearly established law” standard for qualified immunity
excludes recovery by people who have suffered rights violations. 117 This
distinction has potential importance. From the premise that the law should
sometimes define rights by reference to “fault,” in one sense of the term, it
does not follow directly that people who have rights, and whose rights have
been violated, have no moral entitlement to compensation unless the rightviolator acted with “fault” in another sense. 118 Sometimes the law provides
monetary remedies for violations of rights that were not previously clearly
established, including in cases involving regulatory takings. 119
However one ultimately judges Jeffries’s argument, the Equilibration
Thesis that I have advanced in this Essay may offer a distinctive reason for
concluding that no moral entitlement to compensation exists in many cases
involving rights that were not previously clearly established. As noted
above, fairness-based objections to immunity have frequently assumed that
substantive rights are constants, not variables. 120 The fairness-based claim
to a damages remedy for every violation of every right surely weakens
when we recognize that, in the absence of official immunity, at least some
substantive rights might be defined more narrowly. Absent immunity,
some right-holders who sue to seek redress for violations would possess no
rights and, accordingly, no moral entitlement to relief.
This possible justification for a “clearly established rights” standard is
undeniably overbroad. Even in the absence of qualified immunity, some
plaintiffs for whom qualified immunity currently bars recovery would
persuade courts to accept their claims of constitutional right. Nevertheless,
the suggestion that the Harlow standard helps to restrict damages
116. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (liability for negligence
exists when, inter alia, an “interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion” and
the “conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the [plaintiff]”).
117. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982).
118. Jeffries points out, rightly, that the availability of qualified immunity under Harlow
depends on a “negligence-type inquiry” into whether an official should have known that her
conduct was unconstitutional. Jeffries, supra note 89, at 100; see also Barbara E. Armacost,
Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 667 (1998) (arguing that
“notice functions as a surrogate for fault”). Nevertheless, there is a distinction between
negligence as a standard for determining whether a wrong has been done and negligence as a
standard for determining whether a wrongdoer owes compensation to her victim. It is at
least arguable, for example, that wrongdoing is inherent in the idea of a constitutional
violation, see Nahmod, supra note 4, at 1008, or that constitutional violations should trigger
compensation even in the absence of subjective official fault, see Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“[T]he principle of equitable loss-spreading has
joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct.”).
119. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306–07, 320 (1987) (holding that where government has taken
property by land use regulation, a landowner may “recover damages for the time before it is
finally determined that the regulation constitutes a ‘taking’ of his property”).
120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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compensation to cases of moral entitlement may have at least some
explanatory and justificatory power for reasons that are conceptually
unrelated to official fault or lack thereof. If so, the ultimate question would
be whether an admittedly overbroad “clearly established rights” standard is
adequately justified, not because it is inherently fair as applied to every case
(as Jeffries suggests), but because it is not unfair as applied to some
significant fraction of cases and may be preferable to other potential
mechanisms of doctrinal equilibration when the full gamut of potentially
pertinent costs and benefits comes into view.
C. Avoiding Chill with Respect to Change of Law
Professor Jeffries has also argued that immunity doctrines, and especially
qualified immunity, are desirable because they eliminate a practical
impediment that courts would otherwise encounter when considering
whether to recognize rights that they had not previously established. 121 As
I have said already, Jeffries is surely right that official immunity serves the
function of facilitating legal change. But it is a separate question how well
immunity does so.
In Saucier v. Katz, 122 the Court attempted to push immunity doctrine in a
maximally change-facilitating direction by holding that courts should
always rule first on whether a plaintiff had alleged a constitutional
violation. 123 Only if the answer was affirmative should a court go on to
address the further question whether the right was clearly established at the
time of the defendant’s alleged action. More recently, in Pearson v.
Callahan, 124 the Court overruled Saucier and held that courts should make
a case-by-case determination of whether to decide first whether a rights
violation occurred or to proceed directly to the question whether the right
asserted by the plaintiff was clearly established. 125 This decision renders
qualified immunity a less effective mechanism for facilitating legal change
than it was under Saucier. 126 With the prospect that qualified immunity
might reduce the number of occasions when courts will address arguments
seeking an expansion of constitutional rights, the doctrine’s overall effect in
facilitating legal change grows uncertain.
Under these circumstances, alternative mechanisms to stop changes in
law from becoming too costly merit discussion. Absent immunity, the
prospect of imposing retroactive official liability would create the greatest
impediments to change of law in cases in which courts contemplate
dramatic innovations that would catch large numbers of officials unawares.
The Supreme Court once addressed this problem through non-retroactivity
121. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 97–105.
122. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
123. Id. at 200–01.
124. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
125. Id. at 236.
126. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117 (“Going directly to qualified immunity will . . . inhibit the
development of constitutional doctrine . . . .”).
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doctrines that applied only in cases where judicial rulings constituted a
sharp break with prior law. 127 The Court could do so again. 128 Over the
past several decades, it has frowned on doctrines that expressly hold
judicial determinations of rights not to be retroactively applicable to cases
on direct review.129 In its view, failure to apply a rule articulated in one
case to other cases still pending on direct review unfairly treats similarly
situated litigants unequally130 and “violates basic norms of constitutional
adjudication.” 131 For reasons I have given elsewhere, I do not find the
Court’s stated reasoning wholly convincing. 132 Without rehearsing those
reasons, I would make just one point here: as the Equilibration Thesis
emphasizes, official immunity is not the only possible mechanism for
promoting some or all of the goals that immunity currently serves,
including avoiding chill with respect to changes of law.
D. Facilitating Early Dismissal of Frivolous Suits
In Harlow, the Supreme Court emphasized the function of official
immunity in facilitating the dismissal of frivolous suits prior to trial. 133 In
considering this justification for official immunity, it is important to be
precise about the senses in which immunity doctrines might successfully
target frivolous suits. As a conceptual matter, the only effect that every
immunity doctrine has, simply by virtue of being an immunity doctrine, is
to shift the substantive standard that differentiates frivolous from nonfrivolous litigation. For example, absolute judicial immunity makes
frivolous every suit against a judge arising from the exercise of a judicial
function. Qualified immunity makes suits frivolous when they do not
allege violations of clearly established rights. But immunity rules do not
127. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1738–44.
128. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 79
(1989) (proposing this approach).
129. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (holding that “the
integrity of judicial review requires” full retroactive application of new rules in criminal
cases “to all similar cases pending on direct review”); see also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (adopting a similar approach to civil cases).
130. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
131. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.
132. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1764–67, 1807–11 (arguing that most
retroactivity and non-retroactivity questions are best analyzed as arising within the law of
remedies and that the law of remedies does not invariably require a remedy for every rights
violation, especially when there are compelling practical reasons to withhold remedies).
133. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (stating that “public policy . . .
mandates an application of the qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat of
insubstantial claims without resort to trial”); id. at 819 n.35 (reiterating prior admonitions
that “‘insubstantial’ suits against high public officials should not be allowed to proceed to
trial”); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (characterizing qualified
immunity as “an immunity from suit” that is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial”); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The
Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 661 (1989) (observing that “Harlow’s decision
to revise the qualified immunity standard by deleting the subjective prong of the defense
may have been justifiable in order to shield public officials from frivolous . . . suits”).
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necessarily succeed in excluding suits that are frivolous in a deeper, nontautological sense. For instance, plaintiffs can frequently avoid the
immunity bar by pleading plausible-sounding constitutional violations that
they almost certainly could not prove. There is a second sense, however, in
which immunity doctrines might be thought to target frivolous litigation
and to do so relatively successfully. Official immunity might facilitate
dismissal of suits in which good reason exists to think that no actual
constitutional violation has occurred or that plaintiffs could not prove the
facts on which their claims depend. For example, one might think that suits
against judges or prosecutors are especially likely to be frivolous based on
psychological predictions that disgruntled litigants will frequently allege
constitutional violations when none has in fact occurred. 134 One might also
speculate that claims resting on allegations of subjective bad faith are likely
to be frivolous because incapable of proof.
If we assume that immunity doctrines aim to weed out frivolous suits in
this second sense, they almost surely have some effect in doing so, but it is
obvious, too, that they are at best crudely fitted to that purpose. It is
therefore worth asking whether better mechanisms might exist. This
question has current resonance because the Supreme Court appears recently
to have adopted a different, albeit complementary rather than alternative,
doctrinal innovation aimed at securing dismissal of frivolous suits prior to
trial. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 135 the Court held, by a 5-4 vote, that district
courts should dismiss complaints that assert conclusory or factually
implausible claims to relief. 136 In my view, the Iqbal standard contravenes
the plain directive of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.137 It
also licenses discretionary judicial decision making that could seriously
disadvantage plaintiffs asserting unpopular claims. 138 Iqbal does, however,
illustrate the possibility of employing other, potentially better adapted

134. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (“The loser in one forum will
frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus.”);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976) (reasoning that in the absence of immunity,
suits against prosecutors “could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious
actions to the State’s advocate”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (observing that a
judge’s “errors may be corrected on appeal” and that “he should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”).
135. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
136. Id. at 1949–50.
137. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 86 (2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal have
redefined Rule 8(a)(2).”); see also id. at 10 (stating that Twombly and Iqbal continue a
“retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and
equality of litigant treatment”).
138. See, e.g., id., at 83 (“By leaving the notions of abusive discovery and meritless
litigation undefined in Twombly and Iqbal while simultaneously encouraging judges to factor
concerns about them into their Rule 12(b)(6) decisions, the Court has authorized judges to let
their own views and attitudes regarding these phenomena influence their decisionmaking.
This virtually unbridled discretion is inappropriate. It compounds the subjectivity inherent
in the plausibility inquiry.”).
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mechanisms to deal with social costs of frivolous litigation that the Court
has more typically tried to address through official immunity doctrines.
E. Eliminating Costly Litigation when Other Remedies Are Adequate
Absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity, in particular, are often
justified on the ground that other corrective devices internal to the judicial
process make suits for damages against judges and prosecutors unnecessary
as a mechanism for vindicating constitutional rights. 139 When coupled with
the argument that judges and prosecutors would be especially likely to
attract suits from disgruntled parties, notably including criminal
defendants, 140 this argument has long prevailed—and deservedly so, I
would opine. Against the backdrop of the analysis that I have offered
previously, I would add just one further word of caution: even if the
conventional justifications for official immunity doctrines seem persuasive
with respect to one segment of immunity law, we should not complacently
assume that the conventional wisdom is more pervasively correct.
F. Simultaneously Promoting a Multitude of Goals
A final possible aim of official immunity is avowedly multi-faceted:
although not perfectly suited to achieving any of the individual goals that I
have discussed so far, immunity might provide a uniquely elegant,
judicially manageable, and comprehensible means of simultaneously
promoting a weighted mix of all those aims. On this view, transsubstantivity is more a virtue than a vice. It minimizes doctrinal complexity
while serving a number of functions reasonably well, even if none
optimally.
Of all possible accounts of what official immunity might be good for, this
one poses the hardest challenge of evaluation. Admittedly, any full
assessment would need to consider a potentially long series of possible
bundles of doctrinal reforms, not one-for-one substitutions of one rule for
another. But the suggestion that immunity doctrine might be desirable
overall, even if it performs all of its individual functions relatively crudely,
is merely a suggestion, not a conclusion that anyone, so far as I know, has
attempted to establish by careful argument.
Moreover, in the absence of careful argument, skepticism about the
optimality of the status quo seems very much in order. The central,
incentive-based and fairness-based defenses of official immunity both
depend on the assumption that it, and it alone, shields individual officers
from the prospect of potentially devastating personal liability for acts
committed in their personal capacities. As noted above, however, that
premise is at best uncertain and is quite likely mistaken. Without more
empirical knowledge about practices of indemnification, and the incentives
139. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–29 (noting the availability of alternative remedial
mechanisms for prosecutorial misconduct); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (noting that appellate
review can correct a judge’s errors without exposing the judge to civil liability).
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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that they create, we cannot be confident that the main elements of the
existing doctrinal structure do not rest on fallacies. And it seems unlikely,
even though it is not impossible, that doctrines erected on mistaken
premises would turn out by happy accident to be the best possible response
to a diverse amalgam of goals.
G. Partial Summary and Agenda
My inquiry in this part into whether official immunity is well designed to
achieve its intended purposes has generated as many questions as answers.
Although immunity is not obviously maladapted to its asserted aims, it is
not obviously optimal in all respects either. In considering possible
avenues of doctrinal reform, we should ask two kinds of questions that the
scholarly literature to date—albeit with some glorious exceptions 141—has
addressed too infrequently. Some are empirical; we should more
searchingly examine a number of the factual assumptions on which leading
arguments purporting to justify official immunity currently rest. Other
questions that cry out for attention are comparative. Viewing official
immunity doctrine as one potential mechanism of doctrinal equilibration
among others, we should think more imaginatively about possible
alternatives.
CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR COURTS AND SCHOLARS
In this Essay, I have sought to situate questions about official immunity
in the context of broader issues of constitutional implementation. The
Equilibration Thesis that I have advanced here reveals immunity as a
variable among other variables, not a variable among constants. The
Equilibration Thesis depicts rights, causes of action, and surrounding
implementing mechanisms as a package. It further frames the question of
how individual elements of the package might best be calibrated to achieve
the most desirable overall alignment.
In light of the Equilibration Thesis, official immunity is by no means
necessarily the inherently regrettable outcome of a balance of evils that the
conventional wisdom has long assumed it to be. With immunity, we may
have a better scheme of substantive constitutional rights than we would
have without immunity. Without immunity, the social costs of defining
rights broadly would be greater, and we might well have fewer recognized
rights than we have now. But if the purpose of immunity doctrines is, or
ought to be, to promote achievement of the best overall bundle of
recognized substantive rights, causes of action, and other implementing and
limiting doctrines, a leading question needing to be asked involves the
functions, if any, that official immunity doctrines are better adapted to serve
than other doctrines would be. Besides highlighting that question, I have
141. Exemplars include, but are surely not limited to, SCHUCK, supra note 2; Jeffries,
supra note 89; Jeffries, supra note 5; Kramer & Sykes, supra note 101; Pillard, supra note
38; and Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85
MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986).
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suggested some alternative mechanisms for achieving immunity’s
ostensible purposes and have emphasized that the Supreme Court and other
policy makers would be better situated to make good decisions if they had
better empirical information.
Critics of official immunity who confine themselves to narrowly textual,
historical, and precedential analysis risk missing vitally important questions
of constitutional implementation that immunity doctrines inescapably
implicate. By identifying kinds of comparative analysis and types of
information that more sophisticated thinking about official immunity would
require, I have sought in this Essay to mark lines of inquiry not just for
judges and justices, but also for scholars.

